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INTRODUCTION
I have been teaching environmental law for almost twenty years, so
I am pleased to be able to reflect on these years and look to the
future. There are certainly some important emerging trends that could
serve as the topic of this essay, such as the push for more market
solutions to environmental problems, and the increasing need to
integrate environmental and energy policy. But Alexandra Klass has
already written a wonderful piece about the relationship between
energy and environment for this issue, and there are so many
potential concerns I have about how environmental markets can work
that I think that topic deserves a longer piece for consideration.
In any event, something else has been troubling my thoughts about
the arc of environmental law, and that is its increasing complexity as
a discipline in practice. When I first started to teach environmental
law, Congress was just implementing the exciting, new Clean Air Act
("CAA") amendments of 1990 and liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
Thomas F. and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Professor in Environmental Law, and
Director, Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation., and Resources (CLEAR) at the
University of North Carolina School of Law. The author wishes to thank the
Fordham Environmental Law Review and the other authors of these special issues
for a chance to discuss where we are in environmental law. The author also
especially thanks Dylan Mattaway-Novak for his excellent skills as a research
assistant on this article.
1. See generally Alexandra Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM EiVTL L. R. 180 (2013).
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("CERCLA") was still being interpreted by the courts. My class in
enviromnental law would look at the overall structure of the statutes,
note how the regulated community would follow these laws, and
predict what was likely to happen in the further administration of
these laws. An important skill was to be able to determine which
environmental laws might apply to a situation and what the practice
of that application would be.
But to teach environmental law now is to realize that it is a
different creature. Most of the major conflicts are not so much over
the application of the law to general situations, but about the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") tweaking the same old
pieces of a statutory text to fit a problem that the EPA perceives as
currently important. Why? Environmental statutes have not kept up
with changing circumstances and new problems, forcing increasing
complexity on the administrative process.
Looking to explain the last twenty years of enviromnental law in
terms of statutes, there would not be much to say. With a few, very
minor exceptions, one could say that statutory environmental law
has not changed at all since 1990.3 And to read today's tea leaves, it
seems likely that it may not change any more than that in the next
twenty years.4 As Richard Lazarus noted in 2006, "Congress's ability
to serve a constructive role in the ongoing process of enviromnental
lawmaking has virtually disappeared."5 And it has not gotten better
since then, even in the face of the continuing emergence of the most
pressing global enviromnental problem to date: climate change. 6
2. The 2002 amendments to CERCLA created some new substantive
provisions to address the cleaning liability of those who knowingly acquired a
contaminated site but entered into an agreement with the government for clean up.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40), 9607(r), 9622 (2006).
3. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information
Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 75, 78 (2008). See generally Richard J. Lazarus,
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental
Law, 94 GEO. L. J. 619, 629 (2006).
4. Lazarus, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 621-22.
6. Though I predicted major legislative action on climate change in 2007, like
others I was disappointed. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative
Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"?,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123 (2007) (describing each of the federal climate
change bills and denoting the advantages and disadvantages of each): See generally
Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental Leadership:
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But to say that environmental law has not changed is to ignore the
very real consequences that have occurred from successive
administrations pushing the limits of statutory language over the past
two decades; these administrations have been trying to fit the square
peg of emerging policy desires into the round hole of last decade's
statutes. 7 Coupled with omnibus statutes that have affected either the
budget or "process" of environmental administration, these
administrative changes have been considerable. But at what cost?
The failure of our political system to address new environmental
problems and issues generally through statutory change has resulted
in a system that is absurdly complex to understand and practice.
Also, it may have contributed to demeaning judicial review and a
narrowing of perceived methods for addressing the very real
environmental problems that continue to hit us.9 In this essay, I will
trace a bit of this history and explicate some of the administrative
absurdities that we have slogged through, particularly in air
regulation. I will conclude by noting the damage this has done and
calling for more transparency and accountability in policy making.
I. IN THE BEGINNING.. .THERE WAS DARKNESS
But then Congress and the President moved over the face of the
earth, and environmentalists saiw that it iw as good. The passage of the
California's Climate Policy., 24 FORDHAM. ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2013) (focusing on
how California has emerged as a leader in enacting climate change legislation and
implementing a regulatory program of vast and complex scope).
7. J.B. RuhI, Ecosystem Services and the Clean Water Act: Strategies for
Fitting New Science into Old Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 1381, 1382-83 (2010).
8. In 2006. Lazarus argued that most statutory effects on environmental law
then came through the appropriations process. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 622. I
would add to this the plethora of "regulatory reform" laws.
9. In her contribution to this book, Robin Craig notes that environmental
systems are complex, but this does not mean that the framework of law must be
overly complex itself. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Think about
Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resource Law and
Legal Scholarship: A Twenty-Year Retrospective., 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 87
(2013). Even if one argues that law should move toward adaptive systems that rely
on administrative discretion, that system must be centered in foundational
principles made at the Congressional level. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Adapting
Laws for a Changing WYorld: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation,
64 FLA. L. REV. 269 (2012) (explaining how a system of lawmaking can be used to
efficiently create laws that adhere to the changing field of environmental law).
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National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") in 1969, the CAA in
1970, and the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in 1972 are watershed
moments in environmental law precisely because they represent
comprehensive statutory schemes that addressed real problems in a
way that was likely to be effective.10 No one could argue that air and
water pollution were beneficial to the planet or its inhabitants, and we
knew that much of that pollution came from specific sources that
presumably could be controlled through outright bans and
technological advances. Even individualized sources of pollution
(e.g., automobile emissions) were put on the table and addressed."
The glorious achievement of these laws was not that they were the
first environmental statutes,12 but that they introduced a completely
different approach. For the first time, the federal go overnment set
standards and required technological fixes, in addition to allowing
some state flexibility in tailoring pollution responses.' 3
Although one cannot call either of these watershed statutes (or the
similar Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") of
1976) a model of eloquent language or simplicity, their structure is
fairly clear and easy to understand.14 These statutes delineated that
there are acceptable levels of most pollution that are to be set to
protect public health or achieve some other goal,' 5 and the states
were given the primary responsibility of reaching those levels in their
geographic areas.16 In addition, these statutes assigned specific
processes or technology controls to many sources, which insure
10. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 624-25.
11. 42 U.S.C. 7521 (2006).
12. Id. Both the 1970 CAA and 1972 CWA were actually amendments to earlier
federal statutes.
13. See, e.g,. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-11 (2006).
14. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 623 (describing 1970 CAA amendments as
"relatively short in length" and easy to understand).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (National primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (Water quality standards and
implementation plans); 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (2006) (identification and listing of
hazardous waste).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (State implementation plans for national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards): 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006)
(Implementation Plans for water quality standards).
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actual reductions and assist in the attainment of those goals.' 7 Indeed,
at the time the CAA was passed, it was speculated that the
forthcoming technology controls on automobiles and new sources
might be sufficient to reach the health standards that had been set.
The main points of these statutes were clear: to protect public
health, and make decisions about pollution levels and pollution
control to protect that health based on science. And it works. But
there are some side notes as well. Laws enacted around the same time
(Endangered Species Act ("ESA"))8 and parts of the CWA and the
CAA made clear that protecting the enviromnent also had value.19 it
was also assumed that grandfathered sources would be gone fairly
quickly 20 and that it would be possible to set pollution standards at a
natural background or healthful level.21 However, these well
conceived laws might have underestimated the objections that would
come from those that stood to lose economically, as these laws
worked a major re-distribution in the status quo.22
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006) (New source performance standards for major
stationary sources of criteria air pollutants); 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2006) (National
standards of performance for point sources of water pollution).
18. See generally Hope M. Babcock, The Sad Story of the -Northern Rocky
Mountain Gray Wolf Reintroduction Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25
(2013) (noting the government's failure to deal with negative reactions from people
affected by regulatory laws, such as the Endangered Species Act).
19. CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 633
(3rd ed. 2010); see 42 U.S.C. § 7470, 7491, 7492 (2006) (preventing significant
deterioration of air quality areas that meet public health standards and dealing with
visibility).
20. WILLIAM L. ANDERSON ET AL.. CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, CPR
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: BREATHING NEW LIFE INTO THE NATION'S MAJOR
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 15 (2007), available at
http://vww.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR 701.pdf; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853 (1984) (quoting 123 CONG.
REC. S26847 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie)).
21. See Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of
Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. Rev. 1255. 1285 (2004);
JOHNSTON, supra note 17, at 269 (explaining that a choice was made in CAA to
provide the public with healthy air); Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep:
Bringing Environmental Values Back Into the Fold With a New EPA
Decisionnaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1999).
22. RICHARD LAZARUS & OLIVER HOUCK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 2
(2005).
2013]1 1 29
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While it seemed that all could work correctly, the fact that there
were some companies, businesses, and individuals who would bear
the cost of the clean-up brought trouble to paradise. As noted by
Richard Lazarus and Oliver Houck in their introduction to
Environmental Law Stories, the passage of the major environmental
laws worked a radical redistribution in this country.23 Even if
pollution control laws were a perfect internalization of a harm that
was unfairly imposed on others, they still brought a cost to those who
had not been required to shoulder it before.
So the auto manufacturers fought back. Objection to the
implementation of pollution control equipment was fierce.24 The
technology preferred by industry, the catalytic converter, could be
rendered inoperable. 25 Industry successfully petitioned the EPA and
then Congress to delay full implementation of the reductions required
in the 1970 Act.26 They were even more adamant about not
redesigning the automobile or trying to increase gas mileage. This led
to extensive loss of market share in the 1970s, as economic forces
concerning the availability and cost of oil and gasoline drove
consumers to foreign imports that were of smaller size.27
Local government, reliant on taxes from development, also fought
back. One way to reduce air pollution is to control where
development occurs, thus reducing the need for persons to drive long
distances. But what was once anticipated as a major portion of the
State Implementation Plans ran into a brick wall of objection, with
the 1977 CAA amendments prohibiting the federal government from
requiring controls on so-called "indirect" sources, such as
development.2 8
23. Id.
24. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some
Difficulties in Implementing a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. L. J.
1521, 1536 (1996) (explaining that before the 1970 CAA was passed, automobile
manufacturers were found to be guilty of conspiring to hinder the development of
pollution control equipment).
25. See id. at 1537.
26. See id at 1540-43; See also Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories:
Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and PalilaSweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 386
(2004).
27. See Katherine Langley, The Fortress Faces East: Protecting Europe's
Automakers, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1043, 1058 n.77 (1991).
28. See Patrick Del Duca. Indirect Source Controls: An Intersection of Air
Quality Management and Land Use Regulation, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1131, 1138,
[VOL. XXIV
FROZEN IN TITlE
Directly polluting stationary sources, which are of a smaller
number and generally considered the greater pollution villains, did
not effectively fight the statutes as directly as the automobile
industry, but they found effectiveness in the administrative realm.
That administrative struggle has fueled the complexity of
environmental law (particularly in the air area) to this day.
II. THE INCREASING ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERATIONS IN THE CLEAN
AIR ACT
The 1990 CAA amendments represented a salutary effort to update
air pollution regulation and implement new ideas, such as emissions
trading. The amendments also saw the attempt to codify certain
regulatory choices that had been made in the prior decade, wherein
the administrative run on policy had already began. But it did not
stop the increasing regulatory complexity that had already started
under the CAA.29
Three examples, two of which I will go over in detail and all of
which should arguably have been handled statutorily, demonstrate
this incredible regulatory complexity.
A. Nev Source Review
In the 1970 CAA, it was decided that existing sources would not be
required to retroactively install the same pollution control equipment
required of new sources. 30 Instead, existing sources were allowed to
continue operating under a "grandfathering exemption," whereby
they would only have to install the New Source Performance
Standards ("NSPS") pollution control equipment when they chose to
1161 (1991). See generally John R. Nolon, Shifting Paradigms Transform
Environmental and Land UJ se Law: The Emergence of the La4 of Sustainable
Development, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 242 (2013) (positing ten fundamental
paradigm shifts in environmental and economic conditions that change the manner
in which state and local governments control land use, the purpose of which is to
control, among other things., nonpoint source pollution).
29. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.. 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (wherein the conservative EPA changed a critical part of the CAA
so as to allow upgraded sources to continue to postpone changes in upgrading
pollution control equipment through the bubble concept).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2006).
2013]1 13l1
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"modify." A "modification" was defined in the statute as "any
physical change . . . which increases the amount of any air pollutant
emitted... .32 was apparently believed at the time that 1) the
requirement of retrofit to the highest standards for new sources would
be unfair, and 2) the older sources would not continue operating for
much longer.3 3 Thus, a carefully balanced decision had been made
statutorily. While we aspired to the highest clean-up levels that might
only be possible when all major sources were controlled, accepting a
short delay for fairness purposes was acceptable.34 This same
reasoning, citing to the same definition of modification, was also
included in the prevention of significant deterioration new source
review as well as non-attainment new source review in the 1977
Amendments.
The 1977 amendments made significant statutorily weighed
changes to the CAA, seeking to preserve existing clean air,
recognizing other environental values of clean air, and making the
determination that the federal government could not impose land use
controls to meet the requirements of the CAA. * There were also
modest requirements imposed on existing large sources in non-
attainment areas,37 but no major overhaul to the existing/new
distinction enshrined in 1970. The general framework and support for
ultimately retiring the existing sources still held sway.
The EPA, however, had already planted the seeds for ensuing
complexity. In their article reviewing the history of the
"grandfathering" program, Jonathan Remy Nash and Richard Revesz
chronicle how the EPA attempted to clarify what constitutes a
modification, and to exempt very routine repairs:
31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).
33. See Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and
Environmental Regulation: The Lan and Economics of New Source Review, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2007); CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note
20.
34. Id.
35. Michael Settineri, Reforming the -New Source Review Program, 13
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 107, 113 (2001).
36. See Del Duca, supra note 28, at 1131.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7501 (2006).
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The [new] rules provided that which changes qualified as
"modifications would be decided in case-by-case
determinations made by the Administrator. The rules
exempted several key activities, however, from the
definition of modification: routine maintenance, repair, and
replacement: an increase in production rate, if the increase
did not exceed the "operating design capacity of the
affected facility"; an increase in hours of operation; and use
of alternative fuel or raw material if the affected facility
could accommodate such use.
Other rules clarified the scale of application, including the
allowance of "offsetting" emissions from other parts of a source.39
But the individualized nature of the determination only increased
attempts to circumvent these rules. The EPA was rebuffed for its
attempt to limit this statutory provision further by exempting
modifications that did not increase pollution over a certain threshold.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,40 the D.C. Circuit held that the
EPA's jurisdiction of a modification should not be limited by
thresholds, noting that "'modification' is nowhere limited to physical
changes exceeding a certain magnitude."41
That is not the end of the story. What began as a relatively
straightforward statutory command turned to chaos through
administrative tinkering. In the early years of the Reagan
administration there was a backlash against the EPA and other
regulatory agencies. This is well chronicled by Tom McGarity's
contribution to the anniversary issue.42 First, the Reagan EPA
successfully used notice and comment rulemaking to define "source"
in the CAA as entire facilities, which allowed many improvements in
operation to come under a "bubble" without overall increasing
emissions and triggering NSPS or new source review ("NSR").43
Also during the Reagan administration, the EPA promulgated
regulations purporting to clarify the statutory language of
38. Nash & Revesz, supra note 33, at 1684-85.
39. Id.
40. 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
41. Id.
42. Thomas O. McGarity, EPA at Helm's Deep: Surviving the Fourth Attack on
Environmental La4, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 206 (2013).
43. Chevron, USA v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
20131]
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modification. The regulations defined how the measurement increase
was to be determined, and importantly restated that NSR was not
required if the physical change was brought about by "[m]aintenance,
repair, and replacement which the Administrator determines to be
routine for a source category . . . ."44 But the Routine Maintenance
and Repair Rule (RMRR) was accompanied by an administration that
was more sympathetic to business interests. This combination created
a bad incentive encouraging every facility to try and be exempted
from new source requirements.
When faced with upgrading a power plant's pollution control
equipment at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, what source
would not try to come under this regulatory shelter if it could work
with a sympathetic administration? The problem is that for these old
plants to keep operating (at high profit for their owners), they
eventually have to make repairs, some of which would be significant.
It was between this Scylla and Charybdis that the EPA was steered.
By the end of the 1980s, many claims for the exemption were
granted, and many more plants made changes, arguably, with the
belief that they would be defined as "routine." 45 This activity
prolonged the lives of these older plants far beyond what had been
anticipated in 1970.
When a less sympathetic administration came to power, however,
the individualized nature of this review allowed whiplash to set in.
Professor McGarity has ably explained the Clinton administration
posture after 1996 on enforcement against sources that had allegedly
"modified" without installing required equipment.46 Compared with
what had happened in the prior sixteen years, this enforcement might
have been legally sound, but it came as a shock to many of these
sources. The administration brought complaints against thirty-two
utilities in ten states. To quote Professor McGarity, "[the] EPA
initiated dozens of enforcement actions against aging refineries and
power plants", arguing that they "had unlawfully undergone
modifications that significantly increased emissions without
- - *,48
undergoing new source review.
44. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1).
45. CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 20.
46. McGarity., supra note 42, at 215.
47. See New York v. U.S. E.P.A., 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rehg en
bane denied, 431 F.3d 801 (2005).
48. McGarity., supra note 42 at 215.
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The EPA had been in the process of clarifying NSR through
rulemaking, but "frustrated by its own inability to produce the much-
sought-after NSR reform through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
the agency clarified the meaning of 'major modification through the
exercise of its enforcement authority." 49 These enforcement actions
were not merely routine: in many cases they were designed to teach a
lesson. By seeking damages for every day of violation following the
supposed upgrade, which in many cases amounted to years, the
Clinton administration sent a clear signal that it meant business.
These enforcement actions, though legal, sent great backlash
coursing through the serpentine administrative path. While assessing
fines for past violations may be legally sound, the EPA opened itself
up to criticism for allowing the illegal behavior to continue for
decades. Whatever one's personal beliefs on whether or not the
crackdown was long overdue or went too far, it managed to stir a
giant that was to fight tooth and nail through today.
After winning a close election in 2000, President George W. Bush
was considered friendly to energy interests during the earlier part of
his administration.50 For example Vice-President Dick Cheney
chaired a closed-door meeting of energy and other executives that
produced recommendations on energy policy, including "relief" from
arbitrary NSR enforcement.5 The Bush administration in turn backed
off from the earlier Clinton NSR enforcement.52
There also began an attempt to redefine what constituted a
modification for purposes of NSR. The administrative proposals
included extremely long "look back" periods in which the EPA could
look further back for "typical" years of past emissions, increasing the
49. Nash & Revesz, supra note 33, at 1694.
50. Carolyn Bingham Kello, Drawing the Curtain on Open Government? In
Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act., 69 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 367 n.
135 (2003).
51. James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for
Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of
Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 69, 152-53 (2004); Joel A. Mintz, "Treading W1ater": A Preliminary
Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the Bush II Administration, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10912, 10918 (2004); Daniel T. Deacon, Deregulation
Through -Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 812 (2010).
52. William S. Eubanks 11, The Clean Air Act's New Source Review Program:
Beneficial to Public Health or Aerely a Smoke-and-AIirrors Scheme?, 29 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 361, 369 (2009).
20 131] 1 3 5
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likelihood that no emissions increase, and thus no modification,
would be found. Despite its blatant effect, this proposal was upheld
as within the agency's discretion (and statutory language) in the first
challenge to these new rules, New York I. 3 The proposal which
attempted to define "modification" without even reference to whether
or not there were emissions increases was struck down in New Y7ork
I. 54
These cases illustrate the lengths to which administrative changes
have twisted what should have been a relatively clear statute. Several
pages of New, York II are devoted to a discussion of the word "any"
which the majority determines should be given its "customary
effect."55 The EPA attempted to argue for its proposed RMRR
change based solely on policy, as if the D.C. Circuit did not
understand the basic confines of the executive branch and
administrative law.56 Though with the rejection of the proposed
RMRR we have returned to a case-by-case approach, we still have no
reason to assume that there will be consistent application of NSR and
modification over time. Instead, we have to look to newer programs,
such as Mercury regulation, to close down grandfathered pollution
sources.
B. Greenhouse Gas Regulation
There have rarely been such complex statutes as those put forth to
deal with greenhouse gases in the United States. By 2007, "there
were at least ten legislative proposals in Congress [to] address
climate change."57 By 2009, one proposal, the American Clean
Energy and Security (ACES) Act of 2009, had passed the U.S. House
of Representatives.
53. New York v. U.S. E.P.A. (New York 1), 413 F.3d 3, 19-20, 32 (D.C. Cir.
2005), reh'g en banc denied, 431 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
54. New York v. U.S. E.P.A. (New York II), 443 F.3d. 880, 884 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
55. New, York IL 443 F.3d at 885-86.
56. Id. at 889 ("EPA may not avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed
in the text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Flatt, supra note 6, at 123.
58. William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments:
Lessons for Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 33, 62 (2010).
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While the EPA was moving parallel with the possibility of
regulating greenhouse gases under its CAA authority, most saw this
as an ill fit and possibly only as pressure to get Congress to Act.
Indeed, when the Supreme Court came dovn with the Massachusetts
v. EPA case,59 most analysts saw it as confirming that Congress
would now have to pass a comprehensive bill.o With John McCain,
the first Senator to lend his name to a greenhouse gas control bill,
securing the Republican Presidential nomination in 2008, the
likelihood of a comprehensive bill, the first environmental one since
1990, seemed assured. But we were proved wrong again when the
Senate failed to pass comprehensive legislation.61
But while comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation was defeated
in Congress (though arguably by only a Senate procedural device),
many of us began to look anew at the EPA's attempts to regulate
greenhouse gases ("GHGs") through the CAA. What had seemed a
feint, now seemed like possible action.62 What we had failed to get
legislatively, we were going to be able to get through the
administrative process. Now in this story, I am not substantively
critical of the attempt to regulate GHGs under the CAA. In fact, I
think the law requires it. Where the administrative push becomes
absurd is the attempt to have the regulation look as much like the
proposed statutes as possible by regulating the same large group of
sources. All fine, except it explicitly contradicts the statute.
When promulgating the final Prevention of Significant
Deterioration ("PSD") and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
59. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
60. See Flatt, supra note 6, at 123; Press Release, Indiana University News
Room. EPA to Regulate Greenhouse Gases: Indiana University Experts Comment
(Apr. 17, 2009), available at
http://info.law.indiana.edu/news/page/normal/10636.html; James E. Smith,
Benjamin Escobar, BEIRNE., MAYNARD & PARSONs, L.L.P., Regulation of
Greenhouse Gases: The Management of Uncertainty (Nov. 30, 2008), Regulation
of Greenhouse Gases: The Management of Uncertainty, available at
http://ww.bmpilp.com/publications/ 118-regulation-greenhouse-gases-
management-uncertainty.
61. Richard J. Lazarus, Climate Change Law in and over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 30 (2010).
62. On another front, the Second Circuit, which had suspiciously held a
challenge to greenhouse gas emitters for public nuisance for a long time, also
rendered a decision allowing it to move forward. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., Inc., 582 F.3d. 309 (2d Cir. 2009) rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
20 131] 1 317
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the EPA noted that applying "the statutory PSD and title V
applicability thresholds literally to sources of GHG emissions would
bring tens of thousands of small sources and modifications into the
PSD program each year, and millions of small sources into the title V
program," which Congress never contemplated would be covered.63
The EPA argued these small sources would face high permitting
costs with long delays while providing relatively little benefit, as
these sources constitute a relatively small part of the environmental
problem.64
The EPA analyzed different threshold levels for PSD and title V
applicability based on costs to regulated sources and the
administrative burdens to process the applications, ranging from the
100/250 tons per year ("tpy") levels for PSD and the 100 tpy level for
title V to 100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent.65 Administrative
burdens were based on the number of sources that would be required
to obtain a permit at each threshold level.66 For the PSD program, at
the proposal stage, the administrative burdens were calculated based
on the workload differences based on the 280 permits issued annually
now, compared with the 41,000 new and modified sources per year,
which would be required at the 100/250 tpy statutory threshold.67 The
additional cost at the statutory threshold was estimated at 3.3 million
hours at a cost of $257 million to include all sources above the 250
tpy threshold.68 The state and local permitting agencies also reported
significant potential burdens. 69 By the time of the final rule
publication, the likely number of permits had increased to over
81,500 annually.70 For the title V program, similar calculations were
used, with costs calculated between the 14,700 sources currently
covered versus the six million sources that would need to be
permitted at the statutory levels.n As 97% of these sources would be
63. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31533 (June 3., 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70., and 71).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 31533-34.
66. Id. at 31534-35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 31,538.
71. Id. at 31,536.
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commercial and residential, the estimated administrative burden at
the 100 tpy threshold is an additional $15 billion.72
Based on these justifications, the EPA chose to depart from the
100/250 tpy statutory emissions threshold. For the PSD program, the
source has to emit, or have the potential to emit, 100,000 tpy carbon
dioxide equivalent. Modifications resulting in net GHG emissions
increases of 75,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent would also require
a PSD pennit.7 For title V permits, sources already subject to title V
permitting would continue to require a permit.74 Sources which emit
100,000 tpy carbon dioxide equivalent are, under the rule, required to
obtain a permit.
The final rule was challenged by a variety of industry groups and
some states. In addition to discussing other issues with the final rule,
including the Endangerment Finding and the Tailpipe Rule, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed several procedural
issues.76 After noting the administrative burdens the EPA had
estimated if the statutory thresholds were immediately used and how
the EPA determined the appropriate permitting levels, the court
found that all petitioners lacked standing to challenge the "tailoring"
rule.77
The EPA had justified the "tailoring rule" variance with the
explicit statutory requirements on three interrelated grounds
regarding administrative burdens: 1) the absurd results if the statutory
thresholds were used; 2) administrative necessity; and 3) that the
EPA may implement regulatory programs in a piecemeal fashion.
While I am sympathetic to the policy issues making the literal
application of the CAA to these sources difficult, the administrative
proposal clearly pushed the legislative envelope. Administrative
necessity can justify a limited departure from strict statutory
compliance,79 but in this case, why not a smaller threshold (such as
the 25,000 tpy argued by some environmental groups)?
72. Id
73. Id at 31,523-24.
74. Id at 31,524.
75. Id
76. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. U.S. E.P.A., 684 F.3d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
77. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 146.
78. Id at 145.
79. See Alabama Power Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 40 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Luckily for the EPA, the D.C. Circuit found it did not have
jurisdiction, as the petitioners had failed to show the final rule caused
them an "injury in fact," "much less injury that could be redressed by
the Rules' vacatur."80 Instead, the court found the rules mitigated
petitioners' injuries. The court found neither theory that the
petitioners advanced to cure the jurisdictional issue to be credible -
either that the states wanted EPA to immediately apply the statutory
thresholds, or that they had standing based on harns from EPA not
regulating sooner.8' The court finalized its discussion by noting that
it was a stark contrast to Massachusetts v. EPA and that state
petitioners had presented no evidence that they were adversely
affected by the EPA regulation.82
C. The Ozone Debacle
Of all of the absurd administrative stories, none is probably as
dastardly as the ozone debacle, and in this case both the Bush and the
Obama administrations can take credit.
The CAA requires the EPA to revisit its National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS") every five years to ensure that they
are adequate to protect the public health and safety. 8  Every new
promulgation of the ozone standard has been met with challenges and
lawsuits as each fresh examination has indicated the need for more
stringent regulation.84 The proposal of .12 parts per million ("ppm")
one hour average in the Carter administration was challenged as
being both too lax and too strong, and the change to a .08 ppm eight
hour average standard during the Clinton administration was
similarly challenged.85  Relying on administrative deference
arguments, both decisions were ultimately upheld, the last being
appealed to the Supreme Court.86
80. 684 F.3d at 146.
81. Id. at 146-47.
82. Id. at 148.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2006).
84. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
85. American Petroleum. 665 F.2d at 1181.
86. American Petroleum, 655 F.2d 1176, cert. denied; Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
Gorsuch, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457-59 (affirming the
appeals court's decision).
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In 2006. after substantial delay, the Bush administration revisited
the NAAQS rules as required, but proposed a new standard of .75
ppm, which was far above the unanimous recommendations of the
scientists who said an ozone level somewhere between .60 and .70
ppm was necessary to protect the public health.87 A lawsuit followed,
and after the 2008 election, the Obama administration noted the
likely illegality of the .75 ppm, and re-opened the rulemaking. This
delayed a legal decision that likely would have over-turned the 2008
final rules.8 8
The Obama EPA then proposed more rigorous standards that could
be supported by the science of 2006, but delayed the final proposal
three separate times.89 Then, in September, 2012, the Obama
administration - noting that the standards will be revisited again in
2013 (after the election) - withdrew the rulemaking due because of
"the expense." 90
This may be the most clear example of where political
administrative tinkering made matters far worse for public health. In
addition to the delays of all of the lawsuits over the years, by not
following through with the new rules the Obama administration
stated it would propose when it negotiated to drop the lawsuit against
the 2006 proposal, the Obama administration held back what surely
would have been a successful lawsuit in 2008 (and one which will
likely be re-instated).
New evidence suggests that the .60 to .70 ppm limit itself may be
too lenient and that tens of thousands of people every year face
premature deaths due to ozone. 91 Yes, there will be lawsuits and yes,
eventually, the enviromnental groups will win because the law is
clear, but in the meantime, many more people will die, or have their
87. Gabriel Nelson, Bush Ozone Standards Are 'Not Legally Defensible'. N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2011), available at
http://www.nvtimes.com/gxwire/2011/07/14/14greenwire-bush-ozone-standards-are-
not-legally-defensibl- 19743.html.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Deborah Solomon & Tennille Tracy, Obama Asks EPA to Pull Ozone Rule,
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 3, 2012) available at
http:/online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053 111904716604576546422160891728.
html.
91. Mark. W. Frampton, Ozone Air Pollution: How Low Can you Go?, 184 AM.
J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 150, 150-51 (July 15, 2011), available at
http:/ajrccm.atsjournals.org/content/184/2/150full.
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health severely compromised. This again illustrates how seductive it
is for both liberals and conservatives to use the administrative
process to achieve other purposes. While many of us bemoan the
gridlock in Congress, this situation may sit well with groups that do
not wish to have an open policy debate. Therein lies the problem.
III. THE DAMAGE
In addition to increased costs of litigation, lost lives, and lost
productivity, the administrative complexity imposes other hardships.
The most obvious is the lack of public policy debate on issues that
are important and need to be considered cogently.
If the President, members of Congress, or persons with particular
interests want to impose economic costs in more public health
impacts - to protect large corporations from lower costs to control
dangerous pollution, and to make policy decisions to trade off lives
of the young and vulnerable to enrich a smaller slice of the electorate
(those who profit by not controlling their pollution) - they should
have a public policy debate about it in front of the American public.
Similarly, if we are unable to convince the body politic to adopt
better environmental policies, such as a comprehensive cap and trade
bill that directs money to climate change adaptation, we should better
explain and educate, or re-examine the issues ourselves, not simply
use administrative stretching to get to the promised land. This is not
new. As Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts and Stephen R. Thomas
noted in The Environmental Protection Agency. Asking the Wrong
Questions, the agency used obfuscation the first time it had to visit
the ozone standard because economics were too important not to
consider. 92 The continued failure of Congressional policy debates has
only made it worse.
But in addition to the lack of political accountability fostered by
making major policy decisions in the administrative realm, the
increase in complexity means fewer of us understand what is legally
required. Our courts register this confusion. Two recent examples are
particularly compelling.
92. Mark K. Landy et al., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ASKING
THE WRONG QUESTIONS 66-73 (1984).
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In April of 2012, the Fifth Circuit released its opinion in Luninant
v. EPA,93 finding that the EPA's decision to disapprove the State of
Texas Administrative Code § 116.617, governing standard permits
for pollution control equipment that "reduce or maintain currently
authorized emission rates for facilities authorized by a permit," was
arbitrary and capricious under the federal Administrative Procedures
Act.94 While the history of the EPA's disapproval of this portion of
the Texas Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan ("SIP") was not
in compliance with statutory deadlines and subject to conflicting
signals, the Court's reversal was not legally correct.
As the Fifth Circuit correctly points out, the CAA is to be
administered by the federal government and the various states in the
form of cooperative federalism. 95 Also, as the Fifth Circuit correctly
notes, the ability of the federal govermnent to disapprove a SIP is
limited to situations in which it fails to provide attainment and
maintenance of the NAAQS or "any other applicable requirement of
[Chapter 85 of 42 U.S.C.]." 96
However, the Fifth Circuit misinterprets the application of this
standard to the facts in the case. The Texas law allows the state to
disapprove a minor modification in certain circumstances, but
according to the EPA, the circumstances are not sufficient to ensure
that the CAA requirements are being met. In particular, the EPA
noted that the provision was not consistent with other parts of the
Texas law governing CAA compliance, and does not provide for
source specific standards allowing predictability in like sources being
treated similarly. 97 The Fifth Circuit held that the EPA could not
disapprove the rule under the CAA because the federal government
relied on a conflict with Texas law, which the Fifth Circuit claimed
to not be part of the CAA, instead of the federal CAA itself, which
does not specify the need for source specific standards.98 This
decision was a clear misapplication of the law.
First, when a SIP is approved, the requirements of that SIP become
incorporated in the provisions of the federal CAA governing the
93. 675 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2012).
94. Luninant, 675 F.3d at 922-26.
95. Id at 921.
96. Id,; see 42 U.S.C. §7410(1) (2006).
97. Luninant, 675 F.3d at 924-25.
98. Id at 926-27.
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program in that state. 99 As such, inconsistency with prior approved
state provisions is an inconsistency with the CAA as a whole. The
CAA is a complicated law that depends on various provisions
working together. One of the requirements for a SIP to be approved
is that it will allow the state to effectively enforce the CAA.'00 Once
it has been approved, if the state then takes an action that is
inconsistent with its own laws, which have been approved by the
federal government, then that action is also inconsistent with the
CAA as a whole. 0' It was perfectly reasonable for the EPA to
disapprove part of a state program that does not follow another part
of the state program since that would mean it is not consistent with
the standards of the CAA itself.
Second, in stating its requirement that Texas have source specific
minor NSR review, the EPA cited to its prior regulations and
guidance interpreting the provisions of the CAA about effective
enforcement, which found that source specificity was necessary for
this to occur. 102 The Fifth Circuit simply dismisses this argument by
noting that it does not need to give Chevron deference to the EPA's
prior interpretation of the CAA in these regulations because the EPA
did not cite that as authority in the order disapproving this part of the
Texas SIP.10 While such clarity from the EPA might have been
welcome, this is a separate question that is not applicable to the
standards of legal deference that the court owes to the EPA.
EPA's problem is that in the increasing complexity of the CAA
regulations and its back and forth with the states, including Texas, it
has had to make serpentine legal arguments to support its policy. This
has allowed attorneys challenging these proposals to more easily
make inaccurate legal arguments, and, perhaps due to its lack of
experience with the CAA, the Fifth Circuit bought these arguments
hook, line, and sinker. The case may not warrant the gravity of
Supreme Court review, but it is incorrectly decided, and as usual, the
ones who lose are the people of Texas and neighboring states, who
99. Safe Air for Everyone v. U.S. E.P.A., 488 F.3d 1088, 1096-97 (9th Cir.
2007); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006) ("Each State shall ... submit ... a plan which
provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such ...
standard.").
100. 42 U. S.C. §74 10(a)(2)(C).
101. See Safe Air for Everyone, 488 F.3d at 1096-97.
102. Luminant, 675 F.3d at 924.
103. Id. at 927-28.
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fail to get the specific standards that would ensure that their air is
clean enough to support the public health and welfare.
Far more surprising is a D.C. Circuit panel's clear
misinterpretation of CAA law (and repose) in EME Homer City
Generation, L.P. v. EPA.104 This case was brought about on
consolidated challenges to the EPA's attempt to implement the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, a follow up to the Clean Air Interstate
Rule ("CAIR") that the D.C. Circuit found wanting in North
Carolina v. EPA. 0 5 Basically, the rule and its pieces and subsidiaries
were designed to ensure that the states did not cause significant
"interference" with "maintenance" of NAAQS in downwind states
(also referred to as the "good neighbor provision," or Section
11I0(a)(2)(D)). 106
The majority overturns this rulemaking for two reasons: 1) it
claims that the EPA's plan improperly failed to reduce only an
upwind state's share of contributions to a downwind state's
nonattainment; and 2) it erred in simultaneously implementing a
Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP") instead of allowing the states to
first propose a SIP that would reduce the EPA-detennined significant
contribution to downwind states. In doing this, the majority notes that
"[a]lthough the facts here are complicated, the legal principles that
govern this case are straightforward." 0 7 I agree with this statement,
but think the majority actually does what it is criticizing: it
formulates its own complex policy prescription for the EPA to
implement the good neighbor provision, and it ignores clear and
settled law in order to get there.
Much of the disagreement between the majority and the vigorous
dissent by Judge Rogers concerns whether or not much of the legal
basis for the decision was actually before the court. Specifically,
whether the challengers had preserved the issues for appeal
concerning distinctions between the threshold calculation of
significant contribution and reduction calculation, and whether or not
104. 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rehg en banc denied, 2013 WL 656247 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 24, 2013)
105. 531 F.3d 896, 907-8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) on rehg, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 23, 2008).
106. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate
Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals., 76 Fed. Reg. 48208, 48209
(Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97).
107. EIE City of Homer, 696 F.3d at 11.
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the states' had waived the right to challenge disapproval of earlier
SIPs which failed to adequately implement 110(k).os I strongly agree
with the dissent on both of these complaints, but specifically
emphasize that these repose provisions are not just procedural issues.
They exist for a reason. In this case, they are critical to whether and
how the EPA and the states are able to effectively protect the public
health and welfare. The time to challenge the EPA determination was
after the states failed to adequately control interstate contributions
and the EPA disapproved the state plans, not three years after it has
painstakingly crafted a new plan.
Even though these procedural issues are important, the majority
goes even further in simply misstating and misapplying the law. I
will not address all of the issues here, but will address one I believe
to be particularly important. In one fell swoop, because it says it
would be "impossible-to-know,"1 09 the majority eliminates the
CAA's provision that the states themselves bear the responsibility of
implementing SIPs and doing so correctly.110 The majority claims
that it would be impossible to have a SIP with adequate good
neighbor provisions unless the EPA had first set budgets for each
upwind state. This is untrue."' As noted by the dissent, the states
have sophisticated environmental agencies that can have access to
information about production, modeling, and transport of pollutants
as easily as the EPA.1 12 They should not be excused from producing
an adequate SIP because it is too hard. If the EPA wishes to assist in
general pollution budget allocations and rulemaking, that might make
it easier for the states, but it would also take more time. The
prohibition against significant downwind pollution is a provision of
the CAA that has been violated most assuredly since the modern act
was first passed in 1970, and the effect of this opinion further delays
compliance.
The majority's blithe dismissal of the EPA's ability to craft
workable ways for threshold contributions for significance, and other
ways to calculate reductions, is also problematic. The majority
appears to create a mathematical burden of proportional "fair"
108. Id. at 37 n. 34.
109. Id. at 32.
110. Id. at 33.
111. Id. at 49.
112. Id.
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reductions out of whole cloth." Instead of leaving the complex
implementation of air reductions to the agency with which Congress
has entrusted it, an agency with a long history of measurement and
modeling, the D.C. Circuit majority seems to craft its own plan for
how EPA should do its job. This may be more logical to a clever law
clerk handling his or her first environmental case, but that does not
make it the law.
I would usually never presume to boldly state that a federal court
of appeals "got the law vrong." In fact, in my teaching and
scholarship, I go to great pains to note that the court decisions are the
law, but these cases force me to state unequivocally that our federal
courts, the arbiter of our environmental laws, including the CAA, are
themselves, in many cases, ill-equipped to understand the complexity
with which it is now burdened. In Luminant and EMIE City of Homer,
the EPA either took a very long time to make a decision, presumably
because it was unsure of what policy position it wanted or that
position changed during administration changes, 114 or came up with
an incredibly complex program under the CAA to accomplish a
difficult goal that Congress refused to revisit.' 5 This leads to the
complexity that makes interpretation of the Act difficult.
In addition to the complexity faced by our federal courts, there
have been hints of an even more fundamental change - the
assumption that the agencies are acting in the public interest. Jody
Freeman and Adrian Vermeule noted a possible trend: the Supreme
Court "majority's increasing worries about the politicization of
administrative expertise, particularly under the Bush
administration."' As stated by Louis J. Virelli III, "[a]gency
113. Certainly reduction allocations would be subject to the arbitrary and
capricious standard and that may put limits on burden allocations and fairness of
threshold inclusions, but this does not mean the CAA itself requires specific
proportional certainty.
114. See Luminant v. E.P.A., 675 F.3d 917 (5th Cir. 2012).
115. See EIE City of Homer, 696 F.3d 7. Congress looked at a legislative fix for
the original overturning of the Clean Air Act Interstate Rule, but inexplicably (or
perhaps explicably given the thrust of this essay) made no progress. See JAMES E.
MCCARTHY, CLEAN AIR ISSUES IN THE 111th CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, (Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/I0Sep/R40145.pdf.
116. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007).
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expertise is a foundational principle of administrative law."" 7 If there
is a reason for our courts to doubt the expertise portion of that
deference, where do we turn? Again, this focuses attention on our
failure to address new environmental problems comprehensively.
CONCLUSION
The last twenty years of environmental law have seen a disturbing
diminishment in the engagement of the legislative process in
environmental problems. This has either caused or allowed an
increase in complexity of the environmental administrative matrix.
Environmental law is now too complicated to be efficiently
understood and administered. This creates a situation in which the
public must be less engaged with the enviromnent and environmental
law, which causes public accountability to suffer. If the only way we
address problems is to find ever more tortuous readings of long
forgotten tenns in environmental laws now over 40 years old, then
we undermine our ability to see the possibility of addressing our
future challenges. Unless the next twenty years sees a return to
legislative problem solving and administrative accountability, we
may all follow Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit "down the rabbit
hole to wonderland."" 8
117. Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 723, 751 (2009).
118. 696 F.3d at 33.
[VOL. XXIV
